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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
by
N. Alex Bickley"
I.

TORT LIABILITY

The Texas Tort Claims Act. Perhaps the most significant development
in the area of public law during the survey period was the enactment of
the Texas Tort Claims Act.' This Act limits the immunity previously
afforded the state, its agencies, and political subdivisions (e.g., cities, counties, and school districts).' These governmental units, with the exception
of the school district are now liable for:
[P]ersonal injuries or death when proximately caused by the negligence or
wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee acting within the scope
of his employment or office arising from the operation or use of a motordriven vehicle and motor-driven equipment .. . under circumstances where

such officer or employee would be personally liable to the claimant .. .or
[for] death or personal injuries so caused from some condition or some use
of tangible property, real or personal, under circumstances where such unit
of government, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state.a
Under the Act, the liability of school districts is limited to causes of action
arising from the operation of motor vehicles.' In addition to this limitation
of liability for school districts there are a number of other areas in which
governmental immunity was specifically preserved by the new Act!

In preserving immunity for strictly "governmental functions," the
Act was made inapplicable to: (1) claims based upon acts or omissions
of the legislature or its members while acting in their official capacity, or
to legislative functions of units of government; 7 (2) claims based upon
acts or omissions of the judiciary or its members while acting in their
official capacity, or to judicial functions of units of government;" (3)
claims based upon acts or omissions of employees of any unit of government while carrying out the lawful orders of any court;9 and (4) claims
arising from the assessment or collection of taxes by any unit of governB.A., McMurry College; LL.B., University of Texas. City Attorney, Dallas, Texas.
Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 292, §§ 1-23, at 874-79.
:1d. § 2(1), at 875.
aid. § 3, at 875.
4
Id. § 19A, at 879.
5Id. § 14, at 877-78.
s"Governmental function" is a term used by courts to describe "any act which is unique to
governments and which cannot be carried on by individuals or corporations. Legislative or judicial
actions are typical examples." Comment, The Governmental Immunity Doctrine in Texas-An
Analysis and Some Proposed Changes, 23 Sw. L.J. 341, 368 (1969).
7Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 292, S 14(2), at 877.
8
1d. 5 14(3), at 877.
I1d.§ 14(4), at 877.
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ment.'0 Thus, it is apparent that the legislature intended to preserve the
immunity previously enjoyed by the state and its political subdivisions in
the performance of legislative and judicial activities.
Among the other important areas in which immunity has been preserved is the situation in which an officer, agent or employee is responding
to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation, if his action
is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to such emergency
action.11 While it is apparent that this exception was included in the Act
to prevent suits which would otherwise arise from the operation of emergency vehicles (i.e., police and fire department equipment), liability may
still exist if such vehicles are not operated in accordance with the laws
and ordinances applicable to the operation of the emergency equipment
involved.
In preserving the traditional governmental-proprietary distinction," the
Act was made inapplicable "to any proprietary function of a municipality."" In addition, no liability exists under the Act for "[a]ny claim
based upon the failure of a unit of government to perform any act which
said unit of government is not required by law to perform."' " Thus, if
the performance of any act is discretionary with the governmental unit,
its failure to act cannot give rise to a cause of action. It should also be
noted that governmental units are still exempt from liability arising out
of civil disobedience, riot, insurrection or rebellion." Potential recovery
in all suits under the Act is limited to $100,000 per individual and $300,000 per incident.'
Since the Texas Tort Claims Act became effective January 1, 1970, and
was made inapplicable to claims arising prior to that date, 7 it was not
applied in the cases arising during the survey period in which there was
an attempt to establish the tort liability of a unit of local government.
It remains to be seen how the courts will apply the new Tort Claims Act.
However, it should be noted that the only significant change brought
about by the Act should be in the specific instances in which the immunity
has now been waived.
Judicial Decisions. The liability of governmental units is conditioned
upon compliance with certain formalities by the litigant seeking relief.
Generally, city charters contain provisions for the proper filing of notice
of a claim for relief against the city. The importance of giving proper
notice of a potential claim for damages against a governmental unit was
emphasized in City of Denison v. Fulce.' In that case the city charter
required that notice of the potential liability of the city be filed with the
'0Id.§ 14(5), at 877.
"lid. § 14(8), at 878.
"See

Comment, supra note 6, at 344-46.

"Tex.
Laws 1969, ch. 292, § 18(a), at 878.
4
1 1d. § 14(7), at 878.
5
1 1d. § 14(9), at 877.
161d.
§ 3, at 875.
171d. §§ 14(1), 22, at 877, 879.

18437 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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city manager or the city clerk within thirty days of the incident giving
rise to the claim. If the requirements for notice were not met, the claim
was barred. After being injured in an accident involving a street grader
being operated by a city employee, the plaintiff contacted the mayor to
file the proper notice, but the mayor instructed her to contact the city
manager. The city manager told her to contact the claims adjuster for the
insurance company. The actual written notice was filed with the claims
adjuster for the insurance company. Since the city manager had the right
to receive the notice, his direction that notice be given to the insurance
adjuster amounted to a waiver of a strict compliance with the city charter.
Thus, the court of civil appeals affirmed the jury finding that the city
was estopped from denying that proper notice had been filed. This case
can easily be distinguished from the case of alleged waiver and estoppel
in which the person giving the directions as to notice is not the person
with whom a claim should be filed and consequently has no authority to
waive notice requirements or to give instructions under which estoppel
can be asserted.
In Cone v. City of Lubbock 9 damages were limited by notice requirements in a case arising out of plaintiff's excavation of a lake area. The
city secured a temporary injunction in 1963 to prevent the excavation
because of alleged diversion of surface water over a nearby state highway,
and the landowner was successful in having the injunction dissolved in the
subsequent trial on the merits. Again in 1965, the city enjoined the excavations, but this time the defendant cross-claimed against the city for
damages. In obtaining the injunction, the city utilized a state statute0
which makes it unlawful for a person to divert the natural flow of surface
waters in this state in such a manner as to damage the property of another. Since the city was acting solely in its proprietary capacity for the
benefit only of those within its corporate limits in filing for the injunction
when not required to do so by the state statute, it was liable in damages
for a wrongful injunction. However, a claim for damages due to a wrongful restraining order or injunction falls under the provisions of the city's
thirty-day notice requirement. Therefore, only those damages for which
notice had been given within the time limit prescribed could be allowed.
No notice was given of injury resulting from the 1963 injunction but the
cross-claim in the 1965 action brought by the city served as notice of a
potential claim by the landowner.
While a municipality is not subject to liability resulting from injuries
sustained due to open and obvious dangers on city-owned property," injuries resulting from concealed or hidden defects may give rise to liability.
The city of Beaumont was held liable for the death of a workman who
19431 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968), error ref. n.r.e. This case raises some
very interesting questions: Would the same ruling apply if the purpose of the injunction was to
prevent excavation because of a zoning ordinance, or to prevent the diversion of surface waters
which would interfere with the proper operation of the sewer system?
0
' TEx. REv. Cev. STAT. ANN. art. 7589a (1964).
"George v. City of Fort Worth, 434 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error
ref. n.r.e.
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fell while working on the city's water storage tank.' The decedent was an
employee of the corporation which had entered into a contract with the
city to repair the storage tank. The contract called for the sandblasting
and painting of the tank, but did not provide for the replacement of any
bracket assemblies attached to the outer wall. The fall occurred when the
wall of the tank gave way because of rust and corrosion causing the platform on which the worker stood to fall. The jury found that the wall had
become so deteriorated surrounding the bracket assembly as to constitute
a dangerous condition. Further, the jury found that the city had failed
to make a proper inspection of this condition prior to the commencement
of the sandblasting, and that this failure was negligent and the proximate
cause of the injury. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the decision of
the court of appeals and held that the duty was upon the city to inspect
the premises, to discover hidden dangers, and to make them known to the
contractor and his employees, who were considered to be business invitees.
While the contract contained the usual indemnity clause, the court held
that it was only intended to indemnify the city against damages or claims
resulting solely from the acts or conduct of the contractor.
The control of surface waters in the construction of streets, culverts and
drainage outlets has been a recurring problem to counties and cities for
a number of years. In Messer v. County of Refugio' the county constructed a drainage outlet under a county road along the south boundary
of the plaintiff's farm. The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the work
was done in such a manner as to obstruct the natural flow of the surface
water off his land. Apparently, floods occurring from 1958 through 1966
caused some damage to plaintiff's crops in each of those years. The county
asserted the statute of limitations as a bar to the claim, but the court of
civil appeals noted the holding in Austin & Northwest Railway v. Anderson,' which held that successive actions may be brought for injuries of a
continuing nature as they occur. Under that decision, plaintiff could recover damages for injuries occurring within the past two years prior to
the filing of his suit. However, the plaintiff failed to meet the requirements
of article 1573 of the Texas Civil Statutes' which provides that a county
cannot be sued unless a claim has been made to the commissioner's court
and the claim has been refused; consequently, no recovery was allowed
in this case.
II.

ANNEXATION

AND DISANNEXATION

Annexation. Last year's Survey noted that the enactment of the Municipal Annexation Act' in 1963 had given rise to a number of interesting
cases. Cases involving the statute and its interpretation continue to develop.
A significant case discussed in last year's Survey, City of Pasadenav. State
22

City of Beaumont v. Graham, 441 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1969).

23435 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
2479

2

Tex. 427, 15 S.W. 484 (1891).

TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1573

(1962).

21 Tex. Laws 1963, ch. 160, at 447. Article I of the Act is Tax. REa. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
970a (1963).
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7 has been
ex rel. City of Houston,"
reversed by the Supreme Court of
Texas during the current survey period. However, the ultimate outcome
of the litigation will depend upon the results of further trial court proceedings ordered by the supreme court. In that case, the city of Houston
received a favorable verdict from the trial court in a quo warranto proceeding against the city of Pasadena, and that decision was affirmed by
the Houston court of appeals. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the
decision because of the lower court's erroneous interpretation of "adjacency." In 1962 Houston had annexed a meandering ten-foot strip of
land which touched the Houston city limits on each end for a total distance of twenty feet. The strip encircled 44,637 acres of unannexed land
and bordered the city of Pasadena for a distance of five miles. The city
of Houston claimed that the strip was "adjacent" because of a 1962
agreed judgment between Houston and Pasadena giving Houston exclusive annexation jurisdiction over all unannexed territory in Harris County.
However, the supreme court held that Houston had failed to exercise its
right to annex the land covered by the agreed judgment, and therefore the
boundaries of the city had not been extended. The court reasoned that in
order to hold that the annexation was proper, the adjacency requirement
had to be satisfied by the ten-foot boundary touching Houston at both
ends of the strip. Relying on City of Irving v. Dallas County Flood Control District,' which held that a finger of land which was bordered on
three sides by Dallas and one side by Irving was not "adjacent" to Irving,
the supreme court ruled that the ten-foot strip presented a greater degree
of non-adjacency than existed in the Irving-Dallas situation. Since the
land was not adjacent to Houston's city limits, the ordinance annexing
the property was void. However, Houston still challenged Pasadena's claim
to any territory in Harris County. Houston claimed that Pasadena ordinances annexing territory encircled by the ten-foot strip were invalid
because they described land not adjacent to Pasadena after the enactment of ordinances passed by Houston previously in 1965. Therefore,
Pasadena was unable to comply with the requirements of article 1183 of
the Municipal Annexation Acte, which required that property annexed
under that provision be extensions "from the ordinary boundaries of
said city . .. ." Pasadena claimed that the Houston ordinances were invalid
since they did not comply with the requirements of the Municipal Annexation Act. The question remaining for determination was whether or not
Houston had passed valid ordinances in 1965 complying with all of the
prerequisites set forth by the Act." For a determination of this question
27428 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967), rev'd, 442 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1969);
for discussion see Wingo, Local Government, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 194, 199
(1969).
28383 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1964).
25

TEx. REv. CIsV.STAT. ANN. art. 1183 (1963).
as The Act required that proceedings be completed within ninety days of the effective date of
the Act if the proceedings began prior to March 15, 1963. Houston's ordinance which attempted to
annex all of the unannexed territory in Harris County was passed on first reading on June 22, 1960,
and became invalid when Houston failed to complete the annexation within the prescribed time.
During 1965 Houston passed several ordinances attempting to annex territory later included in
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the case was remanded to the trial court."a
During the survey period another annexation ordinance of the city of
Pasadena was also challenged, but the ordinance was upheld by the court
of civil appeals." A corporation owned agricultural property bordering
the city and surrounded by improved industrial property. The city bargained with the owners of the industrial property, agreeing not to annex
their property if the owners would make payments to the city approximately equal to thirty per cent of the city's normal tax rate. Subsequent
to these agreements, which are authorized under article 970a of the Annexation Act,aa the city passed an ordinance annexing the agricultural property
and the owner sought to enjoin the proceeding as unconstitutional. The
plaintiff claimed the resulting differing tax structure was unreasonable,
arbitrary, and capricious. A temporary injunction was entered but was
dissolved by the Houston court of civil appeals. The court held that Pasa-

dena could annex land lying adjacent to the city without annexing all
the other land in the vicinity which was not desirable or in the best interest of the city. The power to annex territory is legislative and a court may
not be concerned with the motives of a governing body in annexing land
within its jurisdiction to annex. The differing tax structure resulting from
the annexation could be challenged after assessment if the scheme of taxation was illegal or unfair.
In another case' action taken under a 1967 Houston annexation ordinance was enjoined by the district court. The injunction was sought by
the Harris County Eastex Oaks Water and Sewer District on the ground
that the property to be annexed was not contiguous to the city of Houston because prior annexation ordinances passed in 1965-which were
allegedly void-brought within the city limits the only areas which would
connect the city to the property to be annexed in 1967. The plaintiffs
attacked the ordinances, arguing that: (1) the area sought to be annexed
was already within the corporate limits of another city; (2) the description
in the notice and in the ordinances was fatally defective; and (3) the city
had failed to comply with the notice requirements of article 970a of the
Annexation Act. The court of appeals dissolved the injunction and rendered judgment for Houston.
While a portion of the land included in the description of land to be
annexed by the 1965 ordinances was in the jurisdiction of another city,
there was a saving clause in the ordinances which provided that there
was no intent to annex any portion of that land which was not within
Pasadena ordinances. Houston attempted to satisfy the requirements of the Municipal Annexation
Act by ordinances and, further to protect its rights to the area if the Annexation Act was declared invalid, passed ordinances attempting to comply with TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts.
1183-87 (1963) and provisions of its charter.
" This case caused considerable turmoil in the state legislature when Houston attempted to
have its ordinances validated. This the legislature refused to do.
a"City of Pasadena v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.--ouston
1969), error ref. n.r.c.
SSTEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (1963).
" City of Houston v. Harris County Eastex Oaks Water & Sewer Dist., 438 S.W. 941 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
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the city of Houston's jurisdiction to annex. Therefore, the ordinances were
not void, but would be interpreted to exclude the territory over which
there was no jurisdiction. The description contained in the 1965 ordinances
was defective, but the court of civil appeals held that it was not fatally
defective since the metes and bounds description necessary to meet the
requirements of a deed is not necessary in an annexation ordinance. The
court stated further that under article 970a, there is no requirement that
the notice of the annexation be in the same form as the annexation ordinance. Notice must be given of a public hearing and there is no particular
requirement as to the description of the territory to be annexed. An
invalid description in the notice would not be fatal. Because the ordinances
were only an irregular exercise of power to annex and were not totally
void, the court held that collateral attack by an individual was not available. The ordinances would have to be attacked in a quo warranto proceeding with joinder by the state. Additionally, the court held that the
1965 annexation proceedings made the property annexed thereby at least
de facto a part of the city.
Disannexation. In the city of Coppell, the city council attempted to use
the power of disannexation to secure a favorable vote in a bond election
and to eliminate a council member who opposed the administration.
Twenty-six days prior to a bond election concerning the issuance of water
and sewer bonds, the council disannexed territory known to contain fifty
voters that would vote against the issuance of the bonds. The bond issues
carried only by nine votes in one case and twenty in the other. This attempted disannexation also eliminated the position for council representative from the area. The residents of the disannexed areas sought to
have the ordinances voided in quo warranto proceedings.' The evidence in
the case showed that the city council had entered into a conspiracy to
disannex the areas in order that the people could not vote against the
bond issues. Further evidence showed that the council had not complied
with article 973 of the Annexation Act 6 in passing the ordinances for disannexation. That article requires that an area being disannexed contain
at least ten acres. Also, the statute requires that the area be uninhabited
or contain fewer than one occupied residence or business structure for
every two acres and fewer than three occupied residences or business structures on any one acre of the territory to be disannexed. The jury found
that both areas disannexed contained three or more occupied residences or
business structures at the time the disannexation ordinance was passed.
The trial court overruled the city's motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto and the court of appeals affirmed.
III.

EMINENT DOMAIN

Within any period of time the eminent domain cases constitute a large
majority of the cases pertaining to the administration of city government.
"5City of Coppell v. State ex rel. Burns, 435 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968).
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 973 (1963).

36
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One of the most litigated areas in this field has been the determination of
permissible public purpose to justify an appropriation of property; however,
the area seems well settled now. Regardless, the question did arise in the
case of City of Wichita Falls v. Thompson. 7 The city was attempting to
condemn approximately forty-six acres above a lake level height. The testimony showed that this property was to be used for cabin sites. The court
of civil appeals affirmed a verdict for the landowner based on the jury
finding that acquisition of this property was in no way related to the
declared purposes of constructing and developing a water supply; nor was
it necessary for the control, maintenance and protection of the water
supply. Since the land was in excess of the land required for the public
use and was intended for a private use, the city did not have the power
to condemn the forty-six acres.
To perfect an appeal from a commissioners' award in a condemnation
proceeding is not difficult; a letter or almost any written request is sufficient." In one recent case in which the state of Texas appealed to the
county court, the state mistakenly recited the date of the commissioners'
award as being April 23rd instead of the actual date, May 23rd. The state
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the county judge to
allow a jury trial after he orally indicated that he planned to abate the
proceedings because of seemingly untimely objections. The court of civil
appeals issued the writ, holding that the state had been deprived of a substantial right and that the appeal was timely taken." The court further
stated that strict and formal pleading requirements do not apply to appeals
from a proceeding of a condemnation commission.
If the condemning authority intends to challenge the right of the condemnee or to challenge his title, such action should be done before posses-

sion is taken of the land.' In 1963 the city of Austin had filed its condemnation action and afterward completed a project on the land so condemned. The city could not, four days prior to the trial in 1967, claim

that the landowner was not the record title holder to the remainder of

the property and thereby challenge his title. It was no longer in a position
to restore possession and could not at so late a date complain about the
inadequate title of the condemnee. The title check should have preceded
the filing of the suit.
The Supreme Court of Texas considered pleading prerequisites for the
introduction of valuation testimony in condemnation suits in Tarrant
County Water Control &. Improvement District v. Hubbard."' A failure
of the condemnor to plead the enhanced value of the remainder of property after the taking did not preclude testimony to show such enhanced
value. An objection to the award of the commissioners is the only pre8'431 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
8
See Thompson v. Martin County, 247 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1952), error

dismissed.
89 State v. King, 437 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
40 City of Austin v. Capitol Livestock Auction Co., 434 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin

1968), error granted.

41433 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1968).
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requisite necessary for the introduction of all evidence pertaining to damages and value.
In another Texas case ' decided during the survey period, the plaintiff
alleged damages due to the temporary interruption of his business during
the completion of a roadway being built next to his eating establishment.
The Beaumont court of civil appeals refused to allow temporary loss of
business as a separate element of damage in the condemnation suit instituted
to gain a portion of plaintiff's property when the remainder of the property was so small that the business could never be resumed. However, the
court did state that recovery for interruption of business may be a proper
item of damages under circumstances which constitute a breach of contract or commission of a tort rather than a taking under eminent domain."a
Also, in order to recover damages to the remainder of a tract partially
condemned, the landowner must show that the damage is peculiar to his
property." If the testimony shows that the decline in value was due to
the character and quality of the whole neighborhood, then such damages
would not be peculiar to the specific residential property in question. This
result is consistent with a long line of cases defining what is a "community"
benefit or damage and what is a "peculiar" benefit or damage.'
The introduction of evidence which shows an increased value of property
due to the project for which it is being condemned is generally opposed
on the ground that the value is to be determined independently of any
enhancement in value attributable to the public use. However, in Barshop
v. City of Houston' a lapse of seven years occurred between the time that
Houston initiated the study for its airport need and the time that it purchased the first tract for the airport in 1958. From 1958 until it made
its offer to Barshop an additional five and one-half years had passed. The
property was taken about one year later. During all this time, the property
was on the edge of the airport, and Houston was not certain that the land
would be needed. During this time the property was continually increasing
in value. Under these circumstances the court applied the rule given in
City of Dallas v. Shackleford,'7 and allowed the increased value due to
the construction of the project itself.
The Colorado River Municipal Water District condemned certain property in Coke County for the purpose of a municipal water supply, dam,
and reservoir." In a portion of the condemned property, the district found
that the surface estate had been separated from the mineral estate. The
42Huckabee v. State, 431 S.W.2d 927

(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968), error ref. n.r.e.

"'Id.at 929, quoting City of La Grange v. Pieratt, 142 Tex. 23, 27, 175 S.W.2d 243, 246
(1943).
"State

v. Wilson, 439 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).

"Id., and cases compiled at 138-39.

46442 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1969).
47 145 Tex. 528, 199 S.W.2d 503 (1947). The rule of City of Dallas v. Shacldeford, as stated
by the court in Barshop v. City of Houston, was that "the valuation date was the date of taking
and the valuation properly included -benefits and enhanced value as a result of improvements
up to the time when the city manifested a definite purpose to take land." Barshop v. City of
Houston, 442 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. 1968).
48Willcockson v. Colorado River Municipal Water Dist., 436 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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District sought to protect itself against the payment of excessive damages
to the mineral estate by limiting the property interests being condemned.
It therefore filed an amended statement in condemnation in which they
pointed out that they were not taking the oil, gas, and other minerals under
the lands and inserted the following provision:
...Petitioner will provide and is in the process of providing earthen mounds
around all oil and/or gas wells and water injection wells within the land
above described presently utilized by Defendants or their mineral Lessees
and will connect such mounds with the shore of the reservoir to be constructed by dykes upon which roads will be located and maintained by District where, in its opinion, such procedures are feasible, and will provide a
barge and operator, upon 48 hours notice to petitioner, sufficient to float
and transport a load not to exceed 100,000 pounds, for use of the oil, gas and
mineral owners or their lessees as necessary to the development and production of minerals. 9
The court of civil appeals held that this was not a mere limitation or

restriction of the property being condemned, but that it was a unilateral
promise as to the future conduct of the District. For this reason it should
not have been submitted in the charge to the jury for their consideration
in valuing the mineral estate. There are ways to limit the damages and
specifically limit the amount of the taking, but they were not properly
utilized in this case.
In the area of expert testimony, the discretion of the trial court is very
broad. Almost any testimony can be introduced as a basis for the opinion
of the expert. Comparable sales are used, and an objection to their introduction usually goes to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the
sale itself. In one case the court did draw the line, however, when a witness sought to support his opinion as to the value of a piece of property
being taken for highway purposes by presenting as evidence a lease of
approximately one-third of an acre of land out of another tract. The
leased property was different in size and location and the witness was
attempting to compare a leasehold estate to a freehold estate."0 Another
court did not allow testimony concerning a service station located in the
city of Amarillo to be compared to a service station site in the city of
Bushland, which was eight and one-half miles west of the Amarillo city
limits."' But in another case the court allowed testimony as to comparable
sales of property with water frontage and access to the city to be compared to property being taken for reservoir purposes where the land was
some seven to twenty-three miles from the condemned property. 2
The courts have been zealous in applying the procedures prescribed in
the eminent domain statutes, and they have required the parties to follow
them rather closely. For this reason the condemnee is not allowed to enjoin condemnation proceedings on the basis that the condemnor has not
negotiated in good faith prior to filing its statement in condemnation.
49

id. at 206.
Cohn v. State, 438 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
51Ford v. State, 432 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
"aTrinity River Authority v. Hutchings, 437 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
5
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This issue can only be tried when the jurisdiction of the county court is
invoked by a timely filing of an objection to the award of the special
commissioners.
Since State v. Meyer 4 the rule seems to be settled in this state that if
a tract of land being taken is a self-sufficient economic unit, its value
should be ascertained by considering it as an entire tract. If it is not selfsufficient, then it may be valued as a portion of the entire tract."5
In City of Houston v. Renault, Inc." the allegation was made that the
city in maintaining a road culvert had caused surface waters to back up
on the premises which the plaintiff had leased to store automobiles. As a
result the water had damaged the automobiles, and the plaintiff sought recovery under article 1, section 17 of the Texas Constitution." This provision for eminent domain provides for damages to be paid when property
is taken or damaged for a public use; however, there was no public use for
these automobiles within the meaning of the constitutional provision. The
constitution does not give a cause of action against those constructing
public works for acts which, if done by an individual in pursuit of a private enterprise, would not be actionable at common law." In this case if
the damage was unintentional, a cause of action would depend upon
whether the conduct of the city was negligent, reckless or ultra-hazardous.
If intentional, the cause of action would rest on whether or not the conduct was unreasonable. Here the court held that the flooding was unintentional, and that there was no showing that the city knew that flooding
of the leased premises was occurring or was certain to result from the
maintenance of the road with the existing culvert; hence, there was no
negligence. The failure of the laws of this state to provide a remedy against
governmental agencies for damage done, as exemplified in Houston v.
Renault, Inc., is subject to criticism. There appears to be little justification
for such an exclusion from liability for damage done.
IV. ZONING
In Farmers Branch v. Haunco" an owner of property obtained a temporary injunction against the city, the city council, the mayor, and the city
planning commission to enjoin hearings to rezone his property from apartment to residential. The city council was authorized by statute to change
zoning laws after conducting a public hearing to consider the contemplated change." The court of civil appeals held that the trial court had
attempted to restrain the city's legislative function of holding public
hearings to consider the advisability of a change in zoning. While ordi" City of Houston v. Plantation Land Co., 440 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969),
error ref. n.r.e.
54 391 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1966).
"City of Tyler v. Brogan, 437 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969).
56431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968).
" TEx. CONST. art. I, § 17.
8 See 431 S.W.2d at 324, and cases compiled therein.
59435 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
0

1 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 10lid-hle

(1963).
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narily a trial court's exercise of discretion in granting a temporary injunction will not be overturned, the court's decision will be reversed if
the application of law to conceded facts is erroneous. A city ordinance
may be challenged in the courts if the plaintiff can show that the city
acted "capriciously, arbitrarily, and unreasonably in passing it."'" However,
this question clearly was not in issue in the Hawnco case. The property
owner also claimed that pre-election campaign statements and promises
concerning zoning issues disqualified certain members of the city council
from participating in future official actions of the council in considering
the city zoning ordinances. The court found little merit in this naive
conception of the American political system.
A different means of attack on zoning ordinances was utilized by
citizens of Bellaire, Texas. The plaintiffs sought an order in the district
court to require the city council to submit certain zoning ordinances to
initiative and referendum elections provided under the charter of the city.
In affirming the trial court's decision for the city, the court of civil appeals
discussed in detail the provisions of the charter incorporating by reference
provisions of the Texas Civil Statutes providing for enactment of zoning
ordinances by the city council." The court noted that the knowledge
necessary to make informed decisions concerning comprehensive zoning
ordinances was substantial and could be presented to voters in an intelligible manner only with difficulty. Also, the court stated that hearing and
notice requirements for the passage of zoning ordinances could not be
satisfied if such ordinances had to be presented to a general election. This
conclusion was based on the reasoning that "for a hearing to be meaningful
it must necessarily be held before the body authorized to act in the
matter. ' ' 3 Since notice and hearing were by the laws of the city and state
an essential part of the zoning procedure, the court felt the power granted
to the people of Bellaire through the initiative and referendum provisions
did not extend to the subject of zoning.
One purchasing property cannot fail to investigate the terms of the
zoning laws or their application to the property he purchases, even though
a previous property owner had been successful in violating zoning restrictions. In Swain v. Board of Adjustment' the previous owner received
from the Board of Adjustment a permit to build a service station contrary
to the zoning ordinances of the city of University Park. The authority of
a Board of Adjustment is expressly limited to exceptions and variances to
the zoning ordinance but not the allowance of new or different zoning.
The new purchaser of property has no right to rely on an order which was
void at its inception as an attempt by the Board of Adjustment to legislate
and change the basic purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance. Even
though the Board of Adjustment allowed a permit for building a service
station in 1933, the city council in 1940 enacted another zoning ordinance
"'43; S.W.2d at 291.
"' Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error ref. n.r.e.

6

s Id. at 4.
4433 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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designating the area as a "dwelling district" and requiring the removal or
conversion of all non-conforming uses by the year 1965. The purchaser
was held to be put on notice that the original order was void, that the
subsequent order was valid and that no estoppel is created against the city
by the action of the Board of Adjustment.
Even after a prospective purchaser makes a perfunctory examination of
the zoning of a certain piece of property, he may not always rest easily.
Sometimes a detailed investigation is required to uncover the true nature
of the zoning. The city of Hutchins had a map which showed a certain
forty-four-acre tract to be zoned "heavy manufacturing." However, the
action of the city council in re-zoning it from "residential" to "heavy
manufacturing" was simply by resolution and not by ordinance. The purchaser of the tract found that his zoning was challenged by the city and
the only saving feature for him was the fact that the actions of Hutchins
had been validated by the state legislature.' Even though the resolution
was completely invalid as it did not comply with the requirements of a
zoning ordinance and was passed without notice to any of the adjoining
landowners, the state statute cured these defects."' Since a municipality is
a creature of the state legislature, an act of the legislature validating acts
of the city is the equivalent of an original grant of authority and cures
irregularities of the municipality's procedure.
V. POLICE POWER

Sunday closing laws have been the object of a large amount of criticism
during the current survey period. However, the laws prohibiting the sale
of certain articles on two consecutive days falling on Saturday and Sunday have fared well in the courts. On November 5, 1969, the Supreme
Court of Texas dealt with the Sunday closing law and the injunction
process enforcing it in these words: "With the long precedent for the
constitutionality of Sunday Closing Laws in this State, and with the view
we take of this statute as set forth above, we hold it to be validly related
to the health, recreation and welfare of the people. ' ' "?
Prior to the supreme court decision the court of civil appeals had ruled
similarly in Hill v. Gibson Discount Center." The closing law may be enforced either by the city, the state, or a private individual. Walter Hill,
employed by Sears, Roebuck & Co. but acting for himself, sought a permanent injunction against Gibson Discount Center to restrain violations of
the state statute by selling or offering for sale certain merchandise on the
consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday. The defense claimed that the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite and contended that
the issuance of the injunction was discriminatory because competitors of
the defendant not enjoined were guilty of the same acts with which it was
" TEx. REv. Cr.

STAT. ANN. art. 974d-12 (Supp. 1969).

66 City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 442 S.W.2d 879

(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
State v. Spartan's Indus., Inc., 447 S.W.2d 407, 417 (Tex. 1969).
1 437 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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charged. The undisputed testimony showed that some of the prohibited
items were sold on two consecutive days of Saturday and Sunday. Articles
which are sold by the employees are sold as agents of the corporation, and
therefore are being sold by the corporation. The Amarillo court of civil
appeals found that the prohibition of a seven-day workweek promotes the
health, recreation and welfare of the people of the state and is a legitimate
exercise of the police power of the state. In Texas a law similar to the
present law prohibiting sales on Sunday was held constitutional as early
as 1888.""

In an attempt by Houston to enforce its building code against the
school district and to require the school district to pay inspection fees for
the construction of its buildings within the corporate limits, the school
district was successful in obtaining a temporary injunction from the trial
court enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance.? The particular building ordinance exempted the city of Houston, any county governments,
the state of Texas, and the United States Government from the payment
of the required fees and set forth penalties for non-compliance. The city
contended on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the
injunction, an equitable remedy, since equity will not enjoin the enforcement of a penal ordinance, unless (a) it is unconstitutional and void, and
(b) its enforcement will violate a vested property right, and cause irreparable injury thereto.' The court of appeals not only dissolved the injunction but also entered a take-nothing order against the school district. The
Texas supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, approved the dissolution
of the injunction, but stated that the civil appeals court lacked the power
to render a decision for defendant and remanded to the district court."2
VI. TAXATION
An injunction to stay the collection of taxes because allegedly the taxation plan is "arbitrary, discriminatory and fundamentally erroneous and
illegal" may be sought by a taxpayer who can establish potential injury
if the plan is made effective. In Superior Oil Co. v. Sinton Independent
School District" the plan of taxation was challenged because some types
of properties" were arbitrarily and discriminatorily excluded from the tax
rolls for levying school district taxes; thus, plaintiff's tax burden was increased. Also, the taxpayer claimed that the amount of taxes to be raised
was in excess of the amount of money required by the school district
budget and that the taxing authority thus abused its discretion in setting
the amount of tax to be levied. The taxpayer paid into court the amount
" Ex parte Sundstrom, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 133, 8 S.W. 207 (1888).
7"City

of Houston v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 436 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston

1968).
7'State v. Logue, 376 S.W.2d 567, 572 (Tex. 1964); Crouch v. Craik, 369 S.W.2d 311, 315
(Tex. 1963); Ex parte Sterling, 122 Tex. 108, 53 S.W.2d 294 (1932).
7

Houston Ind. School Dist. v. City of Houston, 443 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1969).

73431 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1968).
"'Plaintiff had alleged that the school district had deliberately and arbitrarily omitted assessment of cash and bank deposits; however, the Texas civil appeals court sustained the jury's and trial
court's finding that no cash or deposits were deliberately or arbitrarily excluded from assessment.
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of tax that he felt was fair and equitable, and the school district claimed
that title to these funds had effectively passed to it. If a taxpayer defending a suit brought against him for taxes pays money into court, title to
the funds does pass to the taxing authority.m However, in the Superior Oil
Co. case the taxpayer was seeking affirmative relief in contrast to defending
a claim, and thus maintained title to the funds deposited with the court.
The trial court determined on the facts that the planned system of taxation was not discriminatory and denied taxpayer's request for an injunction. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that decisions of taxing boards
in matters of valuations are not subject to collateral attack in the absence
of fraud or other obvious violation of the law.
A taxpayer was successful in challenging the method of valuation for
taxation by the city of Galveston during the survey period."0 The taxpayer
enjoined the tax scheme which taxed all land with more than six apartments as commercial land, and apartments with less than six units as
apartment land. In a case like this one, the taxpayer must only make a
reasonable showing as to other pieces of property in the county and their
assessed value to prove the inequality of his assessment." The inequity of
the Galveston scheme is evident when a great discrepancy exists between
the amount of taxes paid by an owner of a six-unit apartment house and
an owner of a five-unit apartment.
The market value of a piece of property cannot at all times be determined by adding the cost of the purchase of the land and the cost of
constructing improvements. When grain elevators were erected to store
grain under a government program and the program was later discontinued, the market value of these elevators was reduced materially. Failure
to recognize this decrease in the market value would result in a grossly
excessive valuation. m
An attack was made on the tax levy based upon an alleged unlawful
purpose to raise taxes to pay debts or deficiencies created in the former
year.7" School tax funds that are appropriated for operating the school for
the current and subsequent years may not be used to pay obligations of
a previous school year,"0 and such use of the funds would be enjoined.'
However, the plaintiff must show more than mere irregularities in the
tax plan and levy. He must also show that it would result in a "substantial
' Republic Ins. Co. v. Highland Park Ind. School Dist., 123 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1939), error dismissed w.o.j.
" Dietrich v. Phipps, 438 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
" Dallas County v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 142 Tex. 439, 179 S.W.2d 288 (1944). For a recent
case upholding a tax assessment valuation procedure, see Brisco Ranches, Inc. v. Eagle Pass Ind.
School Dist., 439 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), error ref. n.r.e. The Eagle
Pass School District assessment was held not to be illegal because farm land was divided into three
categories where none of the categories actually exceeded the actual cash market value of the land.
An attempt was made to treat all of the owners in the same manner.
" City of Saginaw v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1968), error ref. n.r.e.
7'Harberson v. Arledge, 438 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
"°National Sur. Corp. v. Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 433 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968); Aldine
Ind. School Dist. v. Standley, 154 Tex. 547, 280 S.W.2d 578 (1955); City State Bank v. Wellington Ind. School Dist., 142 Tex. 344, 178 S.W.2d 114 (1944).
" Warren v. Sanger Ind. School Dist., 116 Tex. 183, 288 S.W. 159 (1926).
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injury" to him." Satisfying this requirement is difficult if the taxpayer
cannot show that the valuation exceeded the actual cash market value on
his property. Even if the plan currently in effect were illegal or arbitrary
and plaintiff could show substantial injury, the taxpayer could defeat the
recovery of taxes only to the extent that they were excessive. To prove
this excessiveness is plaintiff's burden. 8
The Conlee Seed Company in the city of Waco did not appear before
the board of equalization to challenge the valuation placed upon its
property and did not pay its taxes; therefore it was sued. The company
defended on the basis that the tax assessment was grossly excessive since
the valuation placed the market value of the property at $80,000 and
taxpayer claimed the market value was $5,000 or $6,000. The decision
of the board of equalization is not subject to collateral attack. However,
it may be attacked if the board adopts an illegal, arbitrary or fundamentally wrong method of valuation or if its valuations are grossly excessive." In the Conlee case, the court held that the taxpayer had successfully
shown so grossly excessive a valuation that no prior challenge of the assessment before the board of equalization was necessary. "Grossly excessive"
has been held to be from two times the value to twenty times the value.'
VII. UTILITIES-FRANCHISES-STREETS

For many years the cities of the state of Texas have been requiring the
developer or subdivider of a tract of land to install streets, water lines, and
sometimes street lights and other items for use by the public including
the purchasers of the lots. One of the hardest fought cases has been
Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. City of San Antonio" in which a developer was
suing the city of San Antonio and the waterworks board of trustees in
that city. For several years prior to 1960 the municipally-owned waterworks of the city of San Antonio, acting through its board of trustees,
required the developers to pay the cost of water mains to a proposed development prior to the approval of the plat for subdividing purposes. This
included the cost of the approach mains which lead from the city's main
transmission line into the subdivision as well as the cost of site water
mains. The board's policy provided for at least a partial refund to plaintiff
of these expenditures based upon the amount of water that was used by
the customer over a fixed period of time. In 1960 the policy was changed
to allow a partial refund only for the transmission main and was not for
the on-site water mains installed for the benefit of the purchasers of the
lots. This suit challenged the validity of the new city regulations.
The testimony showed that if the city paid for the on-site water mains
it would primarily benefit the developer because the developers prior to
82State

v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 265 S.W.2d 569 (1954).

"1City
of Arlington v. Cannon, 153 Tex. 566, 271 S.W.2d 414 (1954).
4
' Conlee Seed Co. v. City of Waco, 434 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1968), error
granted.
1 Id. at 216.
86 433 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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1960 had always passed the cost of the development on to the lot purchasers. The refunds, however, were not passed on to the purchasers.
Article 1119 of the Texas Civil Statutes!' grants to a city the governmental
power to regulate the rates to be charged by public utilities and also the
power to prescribe the rules and regulations under which the utility services
must be furnished. The mere fact that a city owns the water system in
its proprietary capacity does not change this governmental power of regulation insofar as that water system is concerned. The court reasoned that
if the determination as to who was going to pay for these lines were left
entirely up to the developer, then the city would be divested of its governmental power of regulating rates because the rates would be determined by
the number of subdivisions and the manner in which they were constructed, including particularly the cost of the lines. For that reason the
regulation requiring the developer to pay the cost of the lines was upheld.
Apparently this case settled, once and for all in Texas, the right of a
city to require the developer to pay for the lines, and then dedicate them
to the public use.
In addition to exercising a control over the utilities within a subdivision
that is being platted, the city has a very jealous control over its streets,
sidewalks, and other public areas across which a utility must operate.
Ordinarily, the use of these facilities is determined by the contract or
franchise with the public utility itself. The city of Garland had entered
into a franchise arrangement with the Texas Power & Light Company in
1915. Then in 1949 it passed an ordinance which provided that a permit
for an extension could be denied to the public utility company under
certain conditions. This was not a part of the franchise arrangement. In
1964 the franchise of 1915 was extended and there was no mention made
of the subsequent ordinance controlling extensions. When the city denied
the Texas Power & Light Company the right to extend its service, simply
on the basis that the city intended at a later time to serve those same customers, it did so contrary to the terms of the franchise itself. The express
terms of the franchise were contrary to the implications that the ciy desired to put upon it and therefore the company had a right to extend its
service.' This means that if a city intends to regulate the utility at a
subsequent time, it must make provision in the franchise and not attempt
to do it contrary to the express terms of the franchise arrangement.
Once it has been determined that a street easement has been created by
prescription, it is not confined merely to the surface, but extends to a
depth to enable the laying of sewer, gas and water pipes in the right-ofway. This has always been the law insofar as city streets are concerned, but
a case of first impression also extended this right to rural roads."

" TEx. REV. CI.

STAT. ANN.

art. 1119

(1963).

8 Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland, 431 S.W.2d $I1 (Tex. 1968).
"' Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 436 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1969).

